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A PROFESSIONAL DEGREE IS NOT MARITAL PROPERTY
UPON DIVORCE: STEVENS V. STEVENS
In Stevens v. Stevens', the Ohio Supreme Court held that a professional
degree or license is not marital property divisible upon divorce, but should be
considered when making an alimony award.2 The trial and appellate courts did
not consider the husband's degree when awarding alimony to the wife; this was
erroneous and the case was remanded for reconsideration of the wife's alimony
award.'
Several Ohio appellate courts have decided this question in the past."
These courts are split on the question of whether a professional degree and the
accompanying increased earning capacity should be termed property.
However, whether property or not, the courts do agree that the assets are not
divisible upon divorce but should be considered under Ohio Revised Code Sec-
tion 3105.18(B)(1) through (8), (10) and (1 )' when making an alimony award.'
'23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 492 N.E.2d 131 (1986).
21d.
'Id. at 116, 492 N.E.2d at 132.
'In Daniels v. Daniels, 90 Ohio Law Abs. 161, 164, 185 N.E.2d 773, 775 (App. Ct. 196 1), the court held that
a medical degree was property but did not designate it as "divisible" property. The court stated, "In our opin-
ion, the right to practice medicine, being in the nature of a franchise, constitutes property which the trial
court had a right to consider in making an award of alimony." The trial court awarded $24,000 in alimony.
The opinions in Lira v. Lira, 68 Ohio App. 2d 164, 428 N.E.2d 445 (1980) and Pacht v. Jadd, 13 Ohio App.
3d 363, 469 N.E.2d 918 (1983) are consistent with the Daniels court.
Several courts have held that a degree is not property. In Colizoli v. Colizoli, 15 Ohio St. 3d 333, 474
N.E.2d 280 (1984) and in Gebhart v. Gebhart, 14 Ohio App. 3d 107, 470 N.E.2d 205 (1984) the courts stated
that a professional degree is not marital property. The degree should, however, be considered when award-
ing alimony.
5OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Page 1974) provides:
(A) In a divorce, dissolution of marriage, or alimony proceedings, the court of common pleas may al-
low alimony as it deems reasonable to either party.
The alimony may be allowed in real or personal property, or both, or by decreeing a sum of
money, payable either in gross or by installments, as the court deems equitable.
(B) In determining whether alimony is necessary, and in determining the nature, amount, and man-
ner of payment of alimony, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including:
(I) The relative earning abilities of the parties;
(2) The ages, and the physical and emotional conditions of the parties;
(3) The retirement benefits of the parties;
(4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties;
(5) The duration of the marriage;
(6) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because he will be custodian of a
minor child of the marriage, to seek employment outside the home;
(7) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;
(8) The relative extent of education of the parties;
(9) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties;
(10) The property brought to the marriage by either party;
(1I) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker.
(C) In an action brought solely for an order for alimony under section 3105.17 of the Revised Code,
any continuing order for periodic payments of money entered pursuant to this section is subject
to further order of the court upon changed circumstances of either party.
6See Colizoli, 15 Ohio St. 3d 333, 474 N.E.2d 280; Gebhart, 14 Ohio App. 3d 107, 470 N.E.2d 205; Pacht,
13 Ohio App. 3d 363, 469 N.E.2d 918; Lira, 68 Ohio App. 2d 164, 428 N.E.2d 445; Daniels, 90 Ohio Law
Abs. 161, 185 N.E.2d 773.
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This Note first analyzes the Stevens court's opinion and concludes that it
fails to give sufficient direction on how to determine the amount of the
alimony award in order to sufficiently compensate the supporting spouse. Sec-
ond, this Note explores the ways in which courts in other jurisdictions have at-
tempted to compensate the supporting spouse. Finally, this Note proposes two
alternative methods of valuing the supporting spouse's contribution. One
method applies if the court, as in Stevens v. Stevens7, holds that contribution
toward a technical degree is not divisible marital property but should be con-
sidered when awarding alimony. The second method, and perhaps the more
equitable one, can be used to determine an award based on restitution limited
to direct expenditures and cost of lost opportunity.
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Majority Opinion
The parties in this case were married in 1967.8 By mutual agreement, the
wife, Sandra Stevens, attended secretarial school rather than college so that
she could support Robert, her husband, while he obtained his undergraduate
degree and his Doctor of Veterinary Medicine degree.' Throughout the first
eight years of their marriage, Sandra supported the household and paid
Robert's educational expenses while working in various secretarial and ad-
ministrative positions.' 0 Robert did not work and received no loans or scholar-
ships to pay educational expenses during this period."
In 1977, after eight years of school, Robert was awarded his degree and
accepted a job at Sea World of Ohio at a salary of approximately twenty-two
thousand dollars per year.' 2 In July 1983, Robert transferred to Sea World in
Orlando, Florida where he worked earning a salary of approximately forty
thousand dollars per year.'3 Sandra had worked sporadically since 1975 and
was unemployed."'
In March 1984, the parties were granted a divorce. 5 There were few
assets to divide.'6 The trial court awarded Sandra, appellant here, the family
home which was mortgaged and one of the family cars, also mortgaged. 7 In
addition, Sandra was awarded sustenance alimony of four hundred dollars per
'Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d at 115, 492 N.E.2d at 131.
81d.
91d. at 115, 492 N.E.2d at 132.
'OId.
"lid.
121d.
'id. at 115-16, 492 N.E.2d at 132.
14d. at 116, 492 N.E.2d at 132.
15Id.
161d.
17Id
[Vol. 20:2
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month subject to termination:
1) three years from the date of divorce,
2) unless appellant remarried, or
3) unless appellant lived in a state of concubinage, or
4) unless appellant became gainfully employed. 8
Sandra received custody of their child and Robert was ordered to pay sixty
dollars per week child support. 9
On appeal, appellant, Sandra Stevens, contended that appellee's
veterinary degree was marital property divisible upon divorce and that the
alimony award was grossly unfair considering Robert's earning potential." The
court of appeals disagreed and affirmed the trial court's decision."
The Ohio Supreme Court held that a professional degree, or its future
value, is not a marital asset." The court quoted the opinion in In re Marriage
of Graham:3
An advanced degree is a cumulative product of many years of previous
education, combined with diligence and hard work. It may not be ac-
quired by the mere expenditure of money. It is simply an intellectual
achievement that may potentially assist in the future acquisition of prop-
erty. It has none of the attributes of property in the usual sense of the
term .4
The court in Stevens further stated: "Although not an asset, the future value
of a professional degree or license acquired by one of the parties during the
marriage is an element to be considered in reaching an equitable award of
alimony in accordance with R.C. 3105.18."25
While the court here did not consider the professional degree to be a
marital asset, it did hold that the alimony award at the trial court level con-
stituted an abuse of discretion.26 The court considered the sum of four hundred
dollars per month to be grossly inadequate and the conditions attached to the
award to be unfair.27 First, the court held that the three year limitation on the
alimony payments was incorrect given appellant's needs and appellee's finan-
cial situation. 8 Secondly, because the appellant is gainfully employed does not
181d.
19Id
20ld.
2 1 1d.
221d. at 120, 492 N.E.2d at 134.
2
"1d. at 117-18, 492 N.E.2d at 133.
24194 Colo. 429, 431, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978).
"Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d at 120, 492 N.E.2d at 135.
'
6id. at 122, 492 N.E.2d at 136.
Id. at 120-21, 492 N.E.2d at 135-36.
nid at 122, 492 N.E.2d 136.
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mean that her compensation for employment is adequate.' Also, she had been
laid off in the past and could be again in the future. 0 Thirdly, the restriction
terminating alimony if appellant lived in "a state of concubinage" was directly
contrary to the prior decision in Wolfe v. Wolfe:3' "Post divorce unchastity
upon the part of the former wife is not grounds for automatically terminating
the alimony award but may be considered in a subsequent modification pro-
ceeding insofar as it is relevant to the issues of continued need for such
alimony and the amount.""2
In summary, the Stevens court held that the trial court failed to consider
the future value of appellee's degree as an element of the alimony award.3 The
judgment was reversed and remanded to the trial court for redetermination of
the alimony award.3 The court did not, however, provide any guidelines on
the appropriate way in which to value a professional degree or how the trial
court was to consider the degree in relation to the alimony award.
The Dissent
Like the majority, the dissent rejected the conclusion that a professional
degree is property divisible upon divorce. 6 It disagreed, however, with the deci-
sion to require courts to consider the future value of the professional degree
when determining an alimony award. 7 The dissent had two concerns. First,
because alimony is essentially used to provide support, the supporting spouse
might not be awarded sufficient funds to provide educational opportunities. 8
This would not be fair to a spouse who paid for her husband's educational ex-
penses. Secondly, alimony is dependent upon factors such as income and
marital status. 9 If the supporting spouse were to remarry or receive an increase
in salary, the amount received might not be adequate compensation. 4
The dissent stated that a better approach would be to reimburse the sup-
porting spouse for actual expenditures plus interest.4 ' This would minimize
speculation as to future earning potential and would provide an equitable
2Id.
3Id.
"Id. at 121, 492 N.E.2d at 136.
1146 Ohio St. 2d 399, 350 N.E.2d 413, 415 (1976).
"Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d at 122, 492 N.E.2d at 137.
"Id.
"3Id.
3Id. at 123, 492 N.E.2d at 137 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
11d. at 124, 492 N.E.2d at 138.
38Id.
39Id.
4'Id.
'4 Id.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:2
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award for the supporting spouse.'2
COMPARISON To DECISIONS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Other state courts have also answered the question of whether a profes-
sional degree is divisible marital property upon divorce. These responses can be
divided into five basic categories.
1) Several courts have considered the professional degree and the poten-
tial increased earning capacity as marital property divisible upon divorce.43 For
example, the court in Woodworth v. Woodworth" stated that an advanced
degree is marital property because it was the result of mutual sacrifice and ef-
fort by both husband and wife. 4 Fairness dictates that the supporting spouse
be compensated. These courts have assigned a value to the professional degree
and increased earning potential and have included this amount in the property
distribution." In the case of Diment v. Diment'7 , the supporting spouse was
awarded a $39,600.00 property award for the contributions made to the hus-
band's increased earning capacity."
2) Other courts have stated that a professional degree is not marital prop-
erty but that the supporting spouse's contribution should be considered when
dividing the marital assets. 9 In Hughes v. Hughes", the court held that an
educational degree is not property subject to distribution because its value is
too speculative to calculate.5 However, the husband's education should be
considered when distributing the marital assets.52 In Tremayne v. Tremayne,53
421d.
43SeeIn re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976); In re Marriage of
Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 337 N.W.2d
332 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); In re Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); O'Brien v.
O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (App. Ct. 1985); Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d
1071 (Okla. App. Ct. 1974).
"126 Mich.App. 258, 337 N.W.2d 332, (Mich. App. Ct. 1983).
"4Id. at 260, 337 N.W.2d at 334.
"Several courts have determined the value of the professional degree as a percentage share of the present
value of the future earnings attributable to the degree. See Woodworth. 126 Mich. App. 258, 337 N.W.2d
332, O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743. Other courts consider the contributions of
the supporting spouse but do not state a method of calculation. See Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561,
126 Cal. Rptr. 633; In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); In re Marriage of Vanet,
544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Diment, 531 P.2d 1071.
11531 P.2d 1071.
"Id.
"See Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (Ct. App. 1969); In re Marriage of Graham, 194
Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So. 2d 146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Ruben v.
Ruben, 123 N.H. 358, 461 A.2d 733 (1983); Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 339, 331 A.2d 257 (1975); Tremayne v.
Tremayne, 116 Utah 483, 211 P.2d 452 (1949); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1984).
"438 So. 2d 146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
51Id.
521d.
531 16 Utah 483, 211 P.2d 452 (1949).
Fall, 19861 RECENT CASES
5
Scheid: Stevens v. Stevens
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1987
AKRON LAW REVIEW
the court held that the husband's degree was not property subject to division
but did grant the supporting spouse four-fifths of the property accumulated
during the marriage."
3) Another response is to compensate the supporting spouse in an award
of maintenance." In Mahoney v. Mahoney56, the court stated that where the
supporting spouse has deferred her own education, an award of rehabilitative
alimony is appropriate to allow her to enhance her own earning capacity.5"
Other courts recognize the contribution of the supporting spouse as a basis for
an alimony award, but do not give a formula for determining the amount.58
This is the approach used by the court in Stevens.59
4) Still other courts hold that a professional degree is not property but the
supporting spouse is entitled to reimbursement of the contribution made
toward the attainment of the degree.60 In Inman v. Inman6", the supporting
spouse was awarded the amount spent for direct support and school expenses
plus reasonable interest and adjustments for inflation." This method of restitu-
tion allows reasonable certainty in valuing the supporting spouse's contribu-
tion.
5) The fifth and final approach is to simply refuse to compensate the sup-
porting spouse for contributions to the professional degree.63 A court refused to
grant an award primarily because there did not seem to be a legal reason to do
so." The degree was not considered property and therefore was not included in
the property division.65 The court held that an alimony award should be based
on ability to support oneself and not on contributions to educational oppor-
tunities of the spouse.'
5-1d.
"See Lovett v. Lovett, 688 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1985); Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (Ct.
App. 1978); Hill v. Hill, 182 N.J.Super. 616, 442 A.2d 1072 (Ct. App. Div. 1982) modified 91 N.J. 506, 453
A.2d 537 (1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J.Super. 598,442 A.2d 1062 (Ct. App. Div. 1982); In re Mar-
riage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d I, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982).
6182 N.J.Super. 598, 599, 442 A.2d 1062, 1063 (Ct. App. Div. 1982).
57 Id.
sSee, e.g., Lovett v. Lovett, 688 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1985); Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich.App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97
(Ct. App. 1978).
"Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 492 N.E.2d 131 (1986).
61See Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); De La Rosa v. De La Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755
(Minn. 1981); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
6578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
6 2
1d.
6"See In re Marriage of Goldstein, 97 I1. App. 3d 1023, 423 N.E.2d 1201 (1981).
"Id. (The court stated that increased earning potential derived from the husband's medical degree was not
property and therefore was not a marital asset divisible by the court. The court found no basis to consider
the wife's contribution to the husband's degree.)
63Id
"Id.
[Vol. 20:2
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Two METHODS OF VALUING A PROFESSIONAL DEGREE
Value of a Professional Degree - Determining the Alimony Award
The Stevens court held that the value of a professional degree and the
associated increased earning potential should be considered when determining
an alimony award. 7 However, the court failed to provide a method for deter-
mining the value and did not instruct the trial court on how to apply a value to
the alimony award. One possible method is to grant a year of maintenance for
each year the spouse contributed to the education. 9 There have been several
methods proposed" which consider the increased earning potential over the
lifetime of the degreed spouse.
Perhaps a more equitable approach would be to consider the earning
potential only for a period equal to the period of time the supporting spouse
contributed to the degree. This is not as speculative as considering the entire
lifetime earning potential since it is a much shorter period. While it is true that
during the first years of employment earning potential is relatively low, it
seems unfair to consider increases in earning which will be due to additional
experience and training in the chosen field.
An alternative method of valuation is as follows:
1) Determine the number of years the supporting spouse contributed to
the academic endeavors.7 For example, in the Stevens case, the wife supported
her husband for eight years.72
2) Subtract from the above the number of years the parties lived together
after the spouse received the degree and became employed in the professional
field. In the Stevens case the parties lived together for eight years after the hus-
band received his degree73 and therefore the result would be zero.
3) Determine the average annual income of the degreed spouse for the
period of years calculated in step two.
4) Determine the average annual income the spouse could have expected
without the degree. This could be calculated by considering the spouse's field
"
7Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d at 122, 492 N.E.2d at 137.
6Id.
ONote, Divorce After Professional School: Education and Future Earning Capacity may be Marital Proper-
ty, 44 Mo. L. REV. 329 (1979).
7 See, e.g., Id., at 336-40. (Formulation premised upon the difference in potential earning capacity with and
without the degree for each year of the expected working life of the spouse with the professional education.);
Note, Equitable Interest in Enhanced Earning Capacity: The Treatment of a Professional Degree at Dissolu-
tion, 60 WASH. L. REV. 431, 454-59 (1985) (Capitalize present value of enhanced earning capacity for the
working life of the professional spouse and award to supporting spouse an equitable portion of the amount
for the number of years required to obtain the degree. No definition of equitable portion is given.)
"Note, supra note 69.
"Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d at 115, 492 N.E.2d at 132.
73Id.
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of employment prior to the degree or by referring to data regarding average in-
come of persons without advanced educational degrees.74
5) Subtract the income figure derived in step four from the figure
calculated in step three. This represents the increased annual earnings
resulting from the professional degree.
6) Multiply the increased annual earnings by the period of time calculat-
ed in step two and divide by two. This division is necessary because the sup-
porting spouse is entitled to only one-half the increased earnings. This results
in the amount of alimony the supporting spouse should be awarded as compen-
sation for contribution to attainment of the professional degree.
The above method details that portion of the alimony award directly at-
tributable to the educational support. It only compensates the supporting
spouse for financial contributions. In addition, the supporting spouse could
also receive rehabilitative alimony as compensation for lost educational oppor-
tunities.
If this method were applied to the fact situation in Stevens, the supporting
spouse would receive no additional compensation for her contribution to her
husband's technical degree. The parties were married for eight years after the
husband received his degree, during which time the husband assumed virtually
all of the family support." Since the spouse only provided support for eight
years, she has already received a return on her investment through the support
she enjoyed during their last eight years of marriage.
Critics of this method might point out that the supporting spouse only en-
joys the increased earnings for a short period of time while the professional
spouse enjoys a lifetime of enhanced potential." It is significant, however, that
the supporting spouse generally realizes a return of several hundred percent.
The percent return will depend upon the earning potential of the spouse and
the length of the marriage. When compared to other types of investment,
stocks or real estate for example, this is a reasonable return on investment.
Restitution
An alternative method of compensating a supporting spouse is to provide
for the reimbursement of the actual expenditures plus interest.77 This approach
is more favorable for the supporting spouse than the above alternative if the
74Note, supra note 70, at 456-59 (For persons who were employed prior to pursuing the advanced degree,
previous salaries could be used to determine the average annual income without the advanced degree. In the
case of persons who were not previously employed, actuarial tables could be used to determine potential in-
come.)
"Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d at 115, 492 N.E.2d at 132.
6Note, supra note 70.
"Moore, Should a Professional Degree be Considered a Marital Asset Upon Divorce?, 15 AKRON L. REV.
543 (1982).
[Vol. 20:2
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marriage is of long duration. The dissent in Stevens advocated this approach
because it involves minimal speculation as to increased earning potential.78
Calculating the amount of restitution is relatively easy. Simply calculate
the total amount that the wife contributed to the educational expenses, add to
this one half of the contribution for living expenses and calculate the interest
owed on the total. 9
This method eliminates the need to speculate concerning the future earn-
ing potential of the educated spouse but may not provide adequate compensa-
tion. 0 The supporting spouse essentially receives no earnings, above interest,
on the investment. Also, the supporting spouse probably provided moral sup-
port and assistance which is not compensated when this method is used.
CONCLUSION
When a wife has contributed to the attainment of her husband's profes-
sional degree, this contribution is an investment in their future together. When
divorce intervenes and a return on this investment is not realized, it seems only
equitable that the supporting spouse should be compensated.
The problem in this situation is how to adequately compensate the sup-
porting spouse without subjecting the husband to a life of servitude. It seems
unfair to consider the lifetime earnings of the husband when these earnings
will increase due to his own hard work and additional experience in his chosen
profession. The wife should only receive compensation for the amount of time
she contributed to the attainment of the degree. It is important to note that
this amount is independent of child support, rehabilitative alimony, or or-
dinary maintenance deemed equitable by the court for other reasons.
The court in Stevens stated that the contribution of the supporting spouse
should be considered in the determination of the alimony award, but failed to
give a method by which this determination could be made.8' The methods sug-
gested in this note seem to strike a balance between no compensation at all and
enjoying the lifetime earnings of the husband.
KATHERINE SCHEID
"Stevens. 23 Ohio St. 3d at 124, 492 N.E.2d at 138 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
79d.
"Note, Family Law: Ought a Professional Degree Be Divisible as Property Upon Divorce?, 22 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 517 (1981).
"Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d at 122, 492 N.E.2d at 136.
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